Updating: A Psychologically Basic Situation of Probability Revision by Baratgin, Jean & Politzer, Guy
Updating: A Psychologically Basic Situation of
Probability Revision
Jean Baratgin, Guy Politzer
To cite this version:
Jean Baratgin, Guy Politzer. Updating: A Psychologically Basic Situation of Probability Revi-
sion. Thinking and Reasoning, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2010, pp.xx-zz. <ijn 00512278>
HAL Id: ijn 00512278
http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn 00512278
Submitted on 29 Aug 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Running head: UPDATING 1
To appear in Thinking and Reasoning, 2010
Updating: A Psychologically Basic Situation of Probability Revision
Jean Baratgin
University of Paris 8 (Laboratory Paragraphe, CRAC) and Institut Jean Nicod, Paris
Guy Politzer
Institut Jean Nicod, Paris and University of Paris 8
Running head: UPDATING 2
Abstract
The Bayesian model has been used in psychology as the standard reference for the study of
probability revision. In the first part of this paper we show that this traditional choice restricts the
scope of the experimental investigation of revision to a stable universe. This is the case of a
situation that, technically, is known as focusing. We argue that it is essential for a better
understanding of human probability revision to consider another situation called updating
(Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1992), in which the universe is evolving. In that case the structure of the
universe has definitely been transformed and the revision message conveys information on the
resulting universe. The second part of the paper presents four experiments based on the Monty
Hall puzzle that aim to show that updating is a natural frame for individuals to revise their
beliefs.
Keywords: Probability revision, Bayes' rule, updating, focusing
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Updating: A psychologically Basic Situation of Probability Revision
Imagine your host has just proposed a fruit to you and she goes to the kitchen to find the
fruit basket. Talking from the kitchen she informs you that the basket contains two bananas, two
apples, and one pear. Even though you would prefer the pear you tell her to choose any fruit
randomly. From your mental representation of the basket you know that there is one chance out
of five for her to bring back the pear. Then she tells you that the fruit she has chosen (at random)
is not a banana. You now focus on the two apples and the pear and change your initial degree of
belief to get a pear at one chance out of three, in accordance with the new partition elicited by the
message, that is, a subset of three fruit resulting from a partition which you could have envisaged
initially among others (see Fig. 1 left column). In this example, you have an initial knowledge
that refers to a well defined class of reference (universe of possibilities), namely the composition
of the fruit basket (more generally, a population). You learn a precise piece of information
(factual evidence) and you change the reference class in order to focus on just those fruits that
share with the chosen fruit the same property (not to be a banana). You have operated a change
of reference class which results in a change from a prior probability (1/5) to a posterior
probability (1/3). This is not a revision process proper because the posterior probability is
virtually available (among others) and the information “the fruit chosen (at random) is not a
banana” just prompts the selection of a particular posterior probability (among others). There is
no true alteration of your initial belief about the content of the basket but a stricter focus on your
initial state of knowledge specified by new factual evidence. In other words, the message brings
in a refinement of your initial knowledge. This situation of revision is atemporal, meaning that
your initial and final degrees of belief are just two possible values that can theoretically be
defined in advance. It concerns a “belief revision” in a stable universe, that is to say a situation
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where the problem's class of reference (known to you)1 is not modified by the message (indeed
your knowledge of the composition of the basket has not been modified by the message saying
that the chosen fruit is not a banana). This traditional situation of revision where you learn a
message that concerns an object drawn at random from a population of objects which constitutes
a certain stable universe is called focusing on a reference class (Dubois & Prade, 1992, 1997) and
the appropriate way to modify your belief (focusing and normalisation) is the well known
conditioning by Bayes' rule2 (de Finetti, 1974).
Updating and the Minimal rule
Updating
         Imagine that when your friend informs you that the fruit chosen at random is not a banana,
you do not focus on the two kinds of fruit that remain possible; instead you mentally represent
the basket as if the bananas did not exist any more; that is, to compute your chances of eating the
pear you represent the basket without bananas. You estimate your chances of eating your
favorite fruit to be equal to one third. Now, in so doing, you have acted as if you were in another
situation of revision. You have inferred from the message "the fruit chosen is not a banana" the
same information as you would have, had you heard the message "the bananas have been
removed from the basket", and you have conceived a new probability distribution consistent with
your representation of a new basket without bananas. Clearly this situation of revision is
different from focusing. You learn that the universe that consists of the fruit basket has been
modified (a basket with bananas at time t0 versus a basket without bananas at time t1). You turn
your representation into a new basket without bananas (see Fig. 1, right column). Your beliefs,
while correct at one time, may become obsolete due to this change. Thus, the situation of
revision here is temporal and your final degree of belief corresponds truly to a new degree of
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belief inferred from the new composition of the basket. This situation where individuals have to
revise their degrees of belief when the universe —which now is considered as susceptible of
evolving— has changed according to the indication of the new message is called updating. A
word of caution about the terminology is in order. It is common to use the term updating to refer
to probability revision in general (e.g., Hogarth, 1992). Here we are using this term in a technical
sense that differs from this generic sense. In the present paper we follow the usage in the AI
(Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1992; Kern-Isberner, 2001; Winslett, 1990), philosophy (Hansson,
1999) and cognitive economics (Bourgine & Nadal, 2004; Walliser, 2007) communities where
“updating” refers specifically to a situation of revision that takes place in an evolving universe.
The updating operation takes into account the fact that the universe referred to in the knowledge
base has evolved, and so the set of beliefs must evolve accordingly. Formally, it differs subtly,
but also sharply from the focusing situation. It has a clear definition backed up by a set of axioms
for belief revision (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1992) and for probability revision (Walliser & Zwirn,
2002).
The Minimal rule
        However, the new probability distribution entailed by the temporal modification of the
universe (suppressing the bananas) cannot be calculated by Bayes' rule (for a technical analysis
see Gärdenfors, 1988; Walliser & Zwirn, 2002)3. Instead, it is specified by a two-stage process,
called the Minimal rule (Walliser & Zwirn, in press). It consists of a very simple dynamic
process: (i) representing the new universe/class of reference at t1 that results from the
modification of the initial one at t0 (like in our example where the message of suppression of the
bananas entails the existence of a basket without bananas), and (ii) inferring the new probability
distribution for the universe/class of reference at t1. In our example, point (ii) is equivalent to
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conditioning by Bayes' rule since the new probability to choose the pear from the new basket
without bananas is equal to the initial probability to choose the pear modified after normalisation
(to get a sum equal to 1). The Minimal rule generalises Bayes' rule by incorporating the temporal
aspect. It should not be understood as an alternative to Bayes' rule, but rather as a
complementary rule applicable to the situation in question where Bayes' rule just does not apply.
Figure 1. The fruit basket in the focusing and updating situations
Running head: UPDATING 7
The simplified updating strategy
The updating situation is easy to illustrate when its source is an action that modifies the
initial knowledge of the actual universe as in our fruit basket example. But it is noteworthy that
updating may occur without an explicit action. This would be the case with the outbreak of a new
disease that transforms the knowledge base of a physician, or with new statistical data that alter
radically a demographic model. At this stage, it is likely that readers who have worked out for
themselves the solution of the fruit basket example fail to grasp any computational difference
between the two situations. Indeed, the essential claim of the present paper concerns the
hypothesis that reasoners in the focusing situation fail to represent part of the possibilities (the
bananas, even though they still exist), and so handle a new problem which puts them in an
updating situation. We believe that to infer probabilities individuals tend to set themselves
spontaneously in an updating situation even when the situation does not coincide with this type
of revision. Initially individuals envisage a probability distribution of possible occurrences with
respect to their knowledge of a given environment. Upon receiving new information, they infer a
new probability distribution, thinking (or imagining) that the environment has been modified by
the message. This process of updating leads one to the normatively correct probability
distribution when it concerns a single level of belief (which involves a single distribution as
opposed to nested distributions as will be explained shortly), like in our example of the fruit
basket. You have inferred the probability distribution that is correct with regard to the focusing
context by means of the interpretation of the context as one of updating. Because of the simple
structure of the fruit basket example the two situations yield the same result. However, as we
shall see shortly, with revisions that involve several levels of belief, this simplified updating
strategy of revision may lead to an incorrect probability distribution, and consequently an
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incorrect response, even though the problem seems computationally very simple, so that a
paradox arises. This has given rise to well-known puzzles that we are going to exploit.
The primary aim of this paper is to present, possibly for the first time, an experimental
investigation of focusing and updating, which distinguishes a stable universe and a changing
universe. The second aim is to show and illustrate that this distinction is indispensable for a
better understanding of human probability revision, even when we restrict ourselves to the study
of revision in a certain stable universe. This is because, even if the experimenter assumes or
instructs participants that the universe is fixed, it may be the case that they nevertheless consider
a universe in evolution. So, when assessing the coherence of their judgment, the experimenter
must be aware of this possibility and be ready to use the appropriate formalism (Baratgin &
Politzer, 2006). This paper will be organised as follows. In the next section, the two different
situations of probability revision, namely focusing and updating are illustrated by means of the
well known “Monty Hall puzzle” (henceforth MHP). This is an emblematic example of people's
inconsistency in making probability judgment (Granberg & Brown, 1995) that reveals the
structural complexity of many classic tasks and paradigms used in the psychological literature.
This complexity stems from the existence of two levels of belief, which involves nested
probability distributions. This is expounded in the Appendix (section 1) to which we defer the
technical points linked to the MHP. In the main part of the paper we take up the theoretical
analysis developed in Baratgin (2009) which claims that (i) the situation of the MHP as
conceived by the experimenter is a focusing situation; and (ii) participants' modal response stems
from an updating interpretation of the situation, that is, the MHP is difficult to solve because, for
reasons essentially pragmatic, the specific characteristics of the puzzle prompt a biased
interpretation of the revision message which is processed within the framework of updating. This
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will be followed by four experiments that test our approach. The first two use a novel
experimental paradigm aiming to reveal these crucial characteristics of the puzzle. The last two
experiments show that it is possible to avoid such a biased interpretation, in which case
participants give the experimenter's expected (normative) answer. In the general discussion, after
producing evidence that backs up the pragmatic claims, we consider the implications of our
results for the psychological research on probability revision.
The Two Situations of Revision (Focusing and Updating) in The Monty Hall Puzzle
A Typical Example of a Biprobabilistic Structure of Belief
All the experimental paradigms that have been used in the psychological literature share
a common characteristic, namely the existence of nested probability distributions. In other
words, these paradigms are built on a distribution of distributions. Participants must have beliefs
about elementary properties of a given object and the source of these properties (for example, the
various colours of balls extracted from different urns, the various symptoms caused by different
kinds of disease, etc.) In the statement of the problem, the experimenter gives, explicitly or
implicitly, (i) the probability distribution of these properties for each source (e. g., the content of
the urns, or the probability distribution of the symptoms for each disease): This is the nested
distribution (or level 1 distribution); and (ii) the probability distribution of these sources (e. g.,
the number of urns, or the probability distribution of the diseases, etc.): This is the overarching
distribution (or level 2 distribution). To build such a two-level hierarchy of distributions, one
needs three hierarchical layers of worlds, such that a first overarching distribution relates the
layer 2 world to the layer 1 world, and the nested distribution relates the layer 1 world to the
layer 0 world.
A standard version of the MHP presented in a probabilistic format4, is the following:
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A TV host shows you three doors D1, D2, and D3 all equally likely, one
hiding a car and the other two hiding goats. (i) You get to pick a door, winning
whatever is behind it. You choose door D1, say. The host asks you to estimate the
probability that the car is behind D1. (ii) The host, who knows where the car is, tells
you: “I will show you one door (out of the other two) behind which there is a goat”.
(iii) Then he opens D3 to reveal a goat. (iv) Finally he asks you what is the
probability that the car is behind D1.
The experimenter's solution is deeply counterintuitive: The probability that the car is
behind D1 equals 1/3. Indeed, following Bayes’ rule, the correct answer after the host’s opening
D3 to reveal a goat, is that there are twice as many chances that the car is behind D2 as behind
D1 (the explanation is given in section 2 of the Appendix). Yet the crushing majority of people
(whatever their level of instruction) think that there are equal chances for the car to be behind D1
and D2 and accordingly answer 1/2 (for a review see Krauss & Wang, 2003). From now on, we
will refer to the solution 1/3 as (the experimenter's) "Bayesian Solution".
We will argue that the crux of the MHP lies in this: In a genuine situation of focusing
like the MHP, the universe of reference is fixed, and the correct response is 1/3 as calculated by
the experimenter. However, the course of events in the MHP renders the focusing hard to
perceive and induces an updating interpretation within which it is rational to give the modal
answer (1/2)5 (see section 3 of the Appendix). In other words, the latter response is coherent
within an updating interpretation, although it is of course incorrect from the point of view of the
experimenter’s focusing conception of the task.
Based on the hypothesis that participants’ modal answer is induced by a particular
interpretation of the situation of probability revision we are in a position to propose a unified
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explanation which is not contradictory to the explanations found in the experimental literature
(for more detail see Baratgin, 2009). It will also become clear that the MHP refers to a fairly
complex situation, both theoretically and cognitively. The fact that this puzzle exists in various
guises such as the classic "three drawers problem" of Bertrand (1889) or the famous "three
prisoners problem" (Shimojo & Ichikawa, 1989) points to the existence of a cognitive difficulty
to represent their common isomorphic structure, which requires an explanation.
The Focusing and Updating Situations From a Cognitive Point of View
In most studies of probability revision, participants are assumed to understand the
problem exactly as it has been conceived by the experimenter; in particular, a focusing problem
built by the experimenter is assumed to be understood as such by participants. In the frequent
cases where the participants' answers do not coincide with the result calculated by Bayes' rule
participants are deemed incoherent. However, if the participants have not interpreted the revision
situation as a focusing situation, there is an alternative diagnostic: They have a different
interpretation of the problem that may be suggested by the statement and the context of the
problem, while remaining fully coherent within their own interpretation. In that case, participants
cannot be considered as incoherent (from a normative point of view) but only as victims of an
error of interpretation of the revision situation. We concur with Oaksford & Chater's (1996) idea
that participants' apparent errors of judgment and reasoning may result from their rationally
solving a task determined by their interpretation of it instead of solving the task that was initially
conceived by the experimenter.
An examination of the literature on the MHP shows that when experimenters envisage the
different answers they generally fail to consider that participants' interpretation of the host’s
message might not conform to the only situation that they envisage and expect, namely a
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focusing situation of revision. On the contrary, the participants' interpretation of the MHP might
be that of an updating situation which induces the solution 1/2. The strategy leading to this
solution is detailed in the Appendix.
There are strong arguments supporting the hypothesis that participants routinely identify
the revision message as an updating message. These will be considered in some detail in the
general discussion. Suffice it to say now that across the different stages of the MHP the pieces of
information concerning the door opened by the host have a presumption of relevance (Sperber &
Wilson, 1995) and pragmatically suggest a modification of the class of reference (from three
doors to two doors)6.
Taking into Account the Participants’ Interpretation of the Situation of Revision
We present four experiments. The first two test the pragmatic claim that has just been
made and the last two aim to show that participants give the Bayesian Solution as a modal
answer when the hierarchical structure of the puzzle and the focusing character of the message
are both made explicit.
The first two experiments investigate the pragmatic claims. Due to the expectations
resulting from ostensive communication, the MHP is interpreted as a temporal problem of
revision, that is, as a problem in which the initial structure is modified by the new information.
Our hypothesis is that the stronger the participants' expectations about new information, the
greater their tendency to consider any new message released by the experimenter to be relevant.
Therefore even if the message may actually be uninformative, participants will tend to infer
information from it. In Experiment 1 (which corresponds to an isomorphic version of the MHP)
the experimenter delivers an uninformative message like, for example, an already known
message, and so we predict that a sizeable number of participants will nevertheless modify their
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initial degrees of belief. This experiment is a close replication of an experiment carried out in
Baratgin (2007) that shows a redundancy effect, that is, a revision performed after a non
informative message in an isomorphic version of the MHP (the three prisoners problem).
Experiment 1 tests the same hypothesis in a novel isomorphic version of the MHP: Whereas in
the three prisoners paradigm participants read the statement of a scenario and the puzzle is
virtual, here we use a task in which participants really act in the game with concrete objects, like
in the MHP. Experiment 2 studies explicitly participants’ interpretation of the situation of
revision with this novel material that we now describe. Three hollow tubes are used
(corresponding to the three doors of the MHP), one of which contains a ball (corresponding to
the car) while the other two tubes are empty (the MHP goats). Participants experience the same
four stages as in the MHP, namely: (i) choosing a tube and estimating the probability that the ball
is in the chosen tube; (ii) listening to the experimenter's notice that he will open one of the two
non-chosen tubes and show explicitly that this tube is empty; (iii) observing the physical opening
by the experimenter of one empty tube selected among the two tubes that the participant has not
chosen. Finally, (iv) the request to give a new estimate of the probability that the ball is in the
tube initially chosen.
Experiment 1: Redundancy Effect in a Novel Isomorphic Version of the MHP
We claim that the misinterpretation of the situation as one of updating is pragmatically
triggered: In.this experiment we aim to show that if participants expect a piece of information to
be delivered, the content of which they assume to be relevant to their belief, then they will be
inclined to revise, even if the message is uninformative.
Method
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Participants and design. Forty-seven students from the University of the Mediterranean
(France) participated in this experiment. They were ignorant of the MHP. They were tested in
groups of eight to ten and allocated to one of two conditions. They were required to justify their
answers in writing at the end of the experiment.









“Please choose a tube”
Initial judgment “What is the probability that the ball is in the tube initially chosen?”
Answer 1/3 100%
“I will show you one tube (out of
these two tubes) that is
empty”
“at least one tube (out of these two
tubes) is empty”
Stage 2






“What is the probability that the ball is in the tube initially chosen?”
Answer 1/3a 4.3% 0%
Answer 1/2b 95.7% 100%
a Corresponds to the Bayesian Solution
b Corresponds to the solution by the Minimal rule
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Materials and procedure. Three tubes of different colours made of cardboard that could
be closed with stoppers, and one cotton ball were used. There were two experimental conditions
(see Fig. 2). The first condition (the Standard condition) was isomorphic to the standard version
of the MHP. It fulfilled two objectives: One was to replicate the classic results of the MHP, and
the other was to provide a control for the second condition (the Non-informative condition).
In the Standard condition the three tubes and the ball were used instead of the three doors and the
car, respectively. First, the three tubes and the ball were displayed on a table. The experimenter
showed that these three tubes were empty and said that he was going to introduce the ball into
one of the tubes (without a preference for any tube). Participants were invited to manipulate
these tubes and the ball (to see for themselves that the material was not rigged). The
experimenter invited participants to leave the room and introduced the ball into a tube. When
participants were back, the experimenter asked one of them (chosen randomly) to designate a
tube. The experimenter placed this tube slightly aside while the other two remained close to him.
Then the experimenter asked an initial judgment: “What is the probability that the ball is in the
chosen tube? The answer to this question (and similarly for the other quantitative questions of
this and the other experiments) was produced by the participant on a sheet of paper as a
percentage or a fraction. Then the experimenter showed the other two tubes and added: “I know
where the ball is; I will show you one tube --out of these two tubes-- that is empty”. The
experimenter also explained explicitly his strategy to select the empty tube. In particular, he
stated that if the ball was in the tube initially chosen, he would choose randomly the tube to
open, and that if this was not the case he would necessarily show the empty tube. He then opened
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one of these two tubes to reveal that it was empty and put it lying on the table. Then he asked a
final judgment “What is the probability that the ball is in the tube initially chosen?”.
The Non-informative condition involved three judgments of probability. The first (initial
judgment) took place after a participant had chosen a tube, as in the Standard condition; an
intermediate judgment took place after the experimenter uttered the following non-informative
message “I know where the ball is; at least one tube --out of these two tubes-- is empty”; and a
final judgment took place after the experimenter had opened one of the two other tubes to reveal
that it was empty.
Results and discussion
Fig. 2 shows the percentages of response in each condition. Every participant in the two
conditions gave 1/3 for their initial probability estimate. In the Standard condition all but one
participant gave 1/2 as their final estimate, so replicating the result of the classic MHP. The
majority gave explanations supporting the Minimal rule, a typical instance of which is: “the
problem has been transformed, there are now only two tubes, hence their probabilities are equal”.
In the Non-informative condition 46% of the participants revised their probability to 1/2, a
proportion whose 95% confidence interval is [.33; .61]. This is a remarkable result considering
that participants had received the non-informative message “at least one tube --out of these two
tubes-- is empty”. For the final estimate (after the experimenter had revealed an empty tube),
every participant answered 1/2. A majority of participants who had revised their probability after
the non-informative message explained that they did not revise their probability on the third
estimation because when the experimenter showed the empty tube this was no news. In brief,
participants expect a message from the experimenter to be relevant and are eager to revise their
first judgment of probability.
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This study confirms our hypothesis that participants' expectation of a relevant message
from the experimenter has an effect on the interpretation of the three-tube problem, and in all
likelihood on the isomorphic problems (the MHP and the three prisoners problem). Participants
have a tendency to modify their prior probability as if the redundant message was an updating
message. Participants' most frequent verbal justification for the response 1/2, which supports the
hypothesis of an updating interpretation, is that the initial problem (find one tube among three
tubes) has been modified by the experimenter's action into an equivalent problem with just two
tubes (as is the case for the MHP, see the Appendix, section 3). It is important to note that
participants understood the experimenter's explanations regarding his strategy to select the empty
tube in the standard condition (viz., a random choice if the tube initially chosen was not empty
and a constrained choice if the tube initially chosen was empty). Evidence of this was obtained
during debriefing. However, this knowledge was not exploited and seems to have been useless.
So, interpreting the experimenter's action as a structural modification of the initial problem into a
new problem seems to be the essential reason why in the end participants considered only two
possibilities (one empty tube, one non empty tube). The next step is to get direct experimental
confirmation of this updating interpretation.
Experiment 2: An Updating Interpretation of the Focusing Message in an Isomorphic
Version of the MHP
We use the Standard condition of Experiment 1 and a simplified version of the three-tube
problem (the Naive7 condition) in which the experimenter simply removes a tube. As explained
earlier, the main consequence of an updating interpretation is that in the participants'
representation of the problem one tube is missing. If participants use the simplified updating
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strategy, they will behave similarly on these two conditions, that is, they will tend to give the
same answers and to be unaware of the difference.
Method
Participants and materials. One hundred students from the University of the
Mediterranean participated in this experiment. They were ignorant of the MHP. The same
materials as in Experiment 1 were used.
Design and procedure. Participants were tested in groups of eight to twelve. To control
for order effects one half of the participants received the Standard condition first and the Naive
condition second; this order was reversed for the other half. Finally, participants were asked to
indicate if, in their opinion, the two problems were “the same” or “different”, and to explain their
answers in writing. This type of questioning rendered a within-participant design necessary (and
similarly for the next two experiments).
The Standard condition was identical to that of Experiment 1. The Naive condition
differed as follows: At stage (ii), instead of saying, like in the Standard condition, “I know where
the ball is; I will show you one tube --out of these two tubes-- that is empty”, the experimenter
said: “I know where the ball is; I will show you one tube --out of these three tubes-- that is
empty”. He added that he would choose the tube to open randomly from any of the two tubes
that he knew were empty. Then the experimenter opened one of the two tubes not initially
chosen to reveal that it was empty and put it lying on the table. The procedure is summarised in
Fig. 3.
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“Please choose a tube”
First judgment “What is the probability that the ball is in the tube initially chosen?”
Answer 1/3 100%
“I will show you one tube (out of
these two tubes) that is
empty”
“I will show you one tube (out of




Second judgment “What is the probability that the ball is in the tube initially chosen?”
Answer 1/3a 2% 0%
Answer 1/2b 98% 100%
a Corresponds to the Bayesian Solution
b Corresponds to the solution by the Minimal rule
Results and discussion
We analyse first the quantitative answers. If participants view the two conditions as
equivalent, the answers will tend to be the same. The results overwhelmingly support this
prediction as the answers 1/3 (first estimate) and 1/2 (second estimate) were given by 98
participants in the Standard condition and by every participant in the Naive condition. However,
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one might object that identical answers could stem from some uncontrolled factor. This is why
we asked participants to justify their judgment of sameness/difference. If participants tend to
offer the same justifications in the two conditions, then this clearly supports the hypothesis that
their revision stems from similar representations of the problem structure rather than from some
extraneous factor. This is what an analysis of the qualitative answers shows. In both conditions
the majority of the justifications for their judgment of sameness/difference were of the type,
“there are now only two tubes”, which is in line with the Minimal rule. Seventy-six participants
judged the two conditions identical, a proportion whose 95% confidence interval is [.67; .83].
The remaining 24 participants declared the two conditions different but generally did not offer
clear justifications for this. Thirteen wrote that the experimenter showed one empty tube out of
the two non-chosen tubes in the Standard condition and one out of the three tubes in the Naive
condition, with no further elaboration. Out of these 13 participants only five expressed that the
two conditions asked for different responses but did not explain why.
This study supports our main hypothesis that participants understand the structure of the
MHP as a problem where one possibility is cancelled by the experimenter. However the result
could be analysed differently under the hypothesis that participants are not able to represent the
biprobabilistic structure of the MHP (even though they seem to understand the experimenter's
strategy for choosing the tube which is made verbally explicit). In such a case, the answer would
stem from a revision by Bayes' rule applied to a one-level naive probabilistic structure (for this
hypothesis see Fox & Levay, 2004; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, & Sonino-Legrenzi, 1999).
We are going to address this question in the next two experiments where we present a version of
the three-tube problem in which the biprobabilistic structure that corresponds to Fig. 6a1 is made
explicit. In one condition the message is unambiguously a focusing message whereas in another
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one it is unambiguously an updating message. It was hypothesised that participants would no
more interpret the focusing situation as an updating, resulting in a shift from the modal response
to the Experimenter's solution and that participants should even be able to tell the difference
between focusing and updating messages (while failing to differentiate the updating situation
from a standard condition used as a control).
Experiment 3: Focusing and Updating Conditions in the Standard Three-Tube Problem
Method
Participants. Twenty-four participants38 (doctorate and post-doc students, researchers,
University staff at the University of the Mediterranean) participated in this experiment. They had
some knowledge of elementary probability calculus but we had reason to expect that they would
not perform differently than more naive participants. This was based on the fact that the counter-
intuitive character of the MHP and of its isomorphic variants seem to be universal.9
Materials. Three tubes that ended in different boxes and two screens were displayed in
front of the participants (see Fig. 4). Depending on the condition, one of the tubes could be Y-
shaped (an inverted Y).
There were three conditions (to be described below). In the Standard condition, which
served as a control, the materials consisted of the same three straight tubes as in Experiments 1
and 2, and a cotton ball. In the other two conditions, there were two straight tubes, one inverted
Y-shaped tube, two transparent boxes, two screens, and a cotton ball.
Procedure and design. Participants were tested in six groups of four. The material was
displayed on a table. Each group was submitted to the three conditions in one of the six possible
orders. After completion of the three problems, participants had to indicate in writing if, in their
opinion, these problems were “equivalent” or “different” and to justify this judgment.
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The Standard condition was equivalent to the Standard condition of Experiments 1 and
2. This time the participants had to estimate the probability that the ball had fallen through one
of the three vertical tubes, each of which ended in a different opaque box. As in the standard
condition of Experiments 1 and 2 the steps were identical to the MHP (that is, the participant's















First judgment: “What is the probability that the ball fell through the tube that you have selected?”
Answer 1/3 100%
Stage 2




the ball did not fall”
Second judgment: “What is the probability that the ball fell through the tube that you have selected?”
Answer 1/3a 4.2% 79.2% 0%
Answer 1/2b 95.8 % 8.3% 100%
Answer a, with a <
1/3 0% 12.5% 0%
a Corresponds to the Bayesian Solution
b Corresponds to the solution by the Minimal rule
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choice of a tube, the experimenter's notice that he would indicate one tube among the two non
chosen tubes through which the ball had not passed, with the same explicit explanations and
designation of the tube).
Participants could initially manipulate the tubes to see for themselves that the material
was not rigged. In particular, they could observe that when the ball was introduced into a straight
tube it fell (with certitude) straight into the box underneath. The experimenter asked participants
to leave the room. When the participants were back, the three boxes had been concealed by the
screens so that participants could not know through which tube the ball had fallen. The
experimenter asked a pseudo-participant to choose one tube. In fact, this person acted as a
confederate who always chose the middle tube to match the two conditions below (and was of
course discounted from the genuine participants). The experimenter asked: “What is the
probability that the ball fell through the selected tube?”  The experimenter then pointed to the
two other tubes and said: “I will show you one tube --out of these two tubes-- through which the
ball did not fall” and he removed a screen to reveal one of the empty boxes, following which he
asked: “What is the probability that the ball fell through the tube that you have selected?”
In the Focusing and Updating conditions there were two boxes and three tubes were also
displayed in front of the participant. As in the Standard condition the two straight tubes had their
extremity ending in a box; the Y-shaped tube was inverted and had each of its branches ending in
one of two boxes (see Fig. 4). This display allows a visual representation of the biprobabilistic
structure of the MHP. In particular, if the ball was placed in the middle tube (the inverted Y-
shaped tube), it could fall into either the box that was common with the left tube or the box that
was common with the right tube. If the question concerns the probability that the ball has fallen
through the middle tube (whose end is Y-shaped), one gets back to the MHP structure. As in the
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Standard condition, participants initially manipulated the tubes to see that the material was not
rigged. In particular, they could observe that when the ball was introduced into the inverted Y-
shaped tube it could fall (in a symmetric manner) either into the left box or into the right box. In
addition, the experimenter specified that when the ball was introduced into the inverted Y-shaped
tube, it had the same probability (1/2) to fall into either box.
In the Focusing condition the experimenter asked participants to leave the room and
masked the two boxes with the screens. One participant was asked to choose a tube (this
participant was a confederate who always chose the Y-shaped middle tube). The experimenter
asked participants “What is the probability that the ball fell through the tube that you have
selected?” Then the experimenter designated the other two tubes and said: “I will show you one
tube--out of these two tubes--through which the ball did not fall”. Following this, the
experimenter removed one screen (see Fig. 4) and revealed that one box was empty.
The Updating condition was the same as the Focusing condition except that after uttering
“I will show you one tube--out of these two tubes--through which the ball did not fall” the
experimenter selected one of the two straight tubes (see Fig. 4) and removed it; then he asked,
“What is the probability that the ball fell through the tube that you have selected?”
Results and discussion
If participants have the same representation in the Standard and the Updating situations
their answers will be the same. So we expect each participant to give a revised probability of 1/2,
in agreement with the Minimal rule. This is what was observed in the crushing majority of the
cases as 23 our of 24 participants revised their estimate from 1/3 to 1/2 in both conditions
together. Similarly, if participants have alternative representations in the Standard and the
Focusing situations they will tend to give the specific answers determined by their
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representation. So we expect each participant to give a revised probability of 1/3 in the Focusing
condition in accordance with the Bayesian solution. This too was observed in the great majority
of the cases as 19 out of 23 participants (79%) maintained the probability of 1/3 in the Focusing
condition (while updating to 1/2 in the Standard condition). Both results are highly significant
(sign test, p< 10-3). The distributions in percent given in Fig. 4 shows the near identity of the
Standard and Updating conditions and the strong reversal between the Standard and Focusing
conditions. These results are born out by participants' justifications of their similarity judgments:
For the Standard and Updating conditions most participants (79%) judged the two conditions
equivalent, typically justifying this by saying that in both cases the problem is transformed into a
new problem in which one just considers the possibility that the ball comes from one of the two
remaining tubes. So, for these participants the three conditions are equivalent before the
experimenter's action. This means that (i) the representation of the problem in the Standard
condition is viewed as equivalent to the explicit biprobabilistic representation in the other two
conditions. This is another confirmation that the participants have correctly understood and taken
into account the host’s strategy (represented explicitly here by the biprobabilistic structure) at the
beginning of the experiment.; and (ii) what creates the judgment of equivalence is whether there
has been a physical transformation of the initial problem. So, after the experimenter’s action, the
focusing condition according to which participants were aware that no physical transformation of
the initial problem had taken place was perceived as non equivalent to the Standard and
Updating conditions. These results bring further evidence that for participants in the Standard
condition interpret it from an updating point of view.
Finally, in this experiment administered to participants who were not ignorant of
probability theory almost everybody failed to give the Bayesian solution in the Standard
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condition, exactly like in the previous experiment in which participants were ignorant of
probability theory. This shows that there was nothing peculiar that would distinguish the former
population from the latter. It might be objected, though, that the high rate of production of the
Bayesian solution in the Focusing condition was favoured by the educational level of the
participants. This does not seem to hold given the limited cognitive ability and the very
elementary understanding of probability that are required to answer correctly in the Focusing
condition. After the screen has been removed by the experimenter to reveal an empty box and
participants have inferred that the ball has fallen into the other box, which is still screened, they
must (i) understand that there are twice as many chances that the ball has been introduced into
the straight tube as into the inverted Y-shaped tube (as participants have been familiarised during
the initial phase of manipulation), and (ii) then normalise to one, that is, reckon that one chance
for an event against two chances for the other event amount to a probability of one third for the
first event. Technically, normalisation requires an application of the constraint of additivity of
probability and in principle it could be a source of difficulty for novice participants if the
probability distribution becomes complicated. However the literature shows that very few
participants violate this constraint when they are confronted with two complementary hypotheses
made explicit at the same time (for example see Baratgin & Noveck, 2000). Nevertheless, to
ascertain that there was no effect of educational background we have carried out a replication of
Experiment 3 with a population that had not received training in probability at the university
level. Nineteen students attending the second year of Computer Science at the University of the
Mediterranean received the three conditions (Standard, Focusing and Updating). The results
were very close to those found in Experiment 3. Every participant gave the response 1/2 for their
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second estimate in the Standard and Updating conditions whereas sixteen of them (84%) gave
1/3 in the Focusing condition.
The Bayesian Solution was given by a great majority of participants (79% in Experiment
3 and 84% in its replication). To the best of our knowledge such high percentages have never
been observed. This indicates that if participants are helped to form the correct focusing
representation of the problem (the same as the experimenters’ representation), they tend to be
Bayesians. In Experiment 4 we aim to generalise this result to a more counterintuitive version in
presenting a problem with unequal prior probabilities. Indeed, the result of some experiments in
which the problem is formulated with explicitly unequal prior probabilities is that participants
give the Bayesian Solution even less often than they do with the standard MHP or its relevant
isomorphic versions (Granberg, 1996; Ichikawa, 1989; Ichikawa & Takeichi, 1990; Yamagishi,
2003).
Experiment 4: Focusing and Updating Conditions in the Three-Tube Problem with
Unequal Prior Probabilities
The method differed slightly from Experiment 3: The material was modified to make the
prior probabilities equal to {2/4; 1/4; 1/4} for the three tubes, respectively. In this case the
Bayesian Solution is {4/5; 1/5; 0} and the Minimal rule solution is {2/3; 1/3; 0}.10
Method
Participants (N = 12) were selected from the same population (with basic knowledge of
probability theory) as for Experiment 3 but none of them participated in both experiments. They
were tested by groups of two. The three conditions of Experiment 3 were modified as follows.
One of the two tubes previously straight was now Y-shaped at the top, so that there were twice
as many chances for the ball to fall through that tube as there were for it to fall through each of
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the two other tubes (see Fig. 5). Thus the prior probabilities were explicitly 2/4, 1/4 and 1/4. The
experimenter always revealed the box corresponding to the last tube on his right so that for the
three problems it was the tube with a prior of 1/4 that was the locus of a transformation.
Consequently, the result was 1/5 in a focusing interpretation and 1/3 in an updating
interpretation. Again all possible orders of presentation were used.
Results and Discussion










The boxes are masked
Stage 1
“Please choose a tube”
First judgment: “What is the probability that the ball fell through the tube that you have selected?”
Answer 1/4 100%
Stage 2
 “I will show you, among the
two other tubes, one tube
through which the ball did
not fall”
Second judgment: “What is the probability that the ball fell through the tube that you have selected?”
Answer 1/5a 8% 67% 0%
Answer 1/3b 92 % 0% 83%
Answer a, with a < 1/3 0% 33% 17%
a Corresponds to the Bayesian Solution
b Corresponds to the solution by the Minimal rule
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The distributions of the answers for the three conditions are given in Fig. 5. Results are
similar to those of Experiment 3. All the participants in the three conditions gave 1/4 as the prior
probability for the tube they chose. For the second estimate, 9 out of 12 participants gave the
Minimal rule solution of 1/3 in both the Standard and Updating conditions. The Focusing
condition gave rise to a reversal as 10 out of 12 participants gave both the Bayesian solution 1/5
in the Focusing condition and the Minimal rule solution 1/3 in the Standard condition. Sign tests
applied to these frequencies indicate that the latter result is significant (p<.02) but the former is
only close to significance (p<.073), presumably for lack of statistical power due to the small
numbers. However, any doubt regarding the reliability of the results can be eliminated by
considering participant's justifications for their comparison judgments, like for the previous
experiment. The justifications routinely supported the Minimal rule. For the Standard as well as
the Updating condition they expressed that there was one possibility left for a tube and two for
the other. Eight participants judged these two conditions equivalent. By contrast, in the Focusing
condition eight participants gave the Bayesian Solution (1/5) accompanied by a justification that
agrees with Bayes’ rule to the effect that there was one possibility for a tube and four for the
second; three participants explicitly expressed that the probability had decreased but they had
difficulty giving a quantitative value, which suggests that they may have experienced difficulty
in normalising the probabilities; the last answer was 1/4 justified by the notion that nothing has
changed with the tube.
Burns & Wieth (2004) showed an improvement in participants' performance with the
MHP versions where the biprobabilistic structure is explicit. Experiments 3 and 4 generalise this
hypothesis in underscoring that when this is the case, participants also distinguish between
focusing and updating interpretations of the message: In these two conditions, the relations
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between layers are revealed by the experimenter’s message. When the screen is removed by the
experimenter, there is no change in the structure of the problem and participants focus on the
subset of different possibilities for the ball to fall into the other box. But when a straight tube is
removed, the structure of the problem is modified and participants give their new probability
distribution corresponding to this new problem. In contrast, participants clearly identify the
Standard condition as equivalent to the Updating condition.
In brief, the result of the last two experiments is that participants answer rationally as a
function of the perceived situation of revision. As we have already argued, this proceeds from
the individual's spontaneous adoption of the naive set with one degree of belief composed of the
three tubes. Participants carry on a simplified updating strategy by considering the set composed
of the two tubes that are not invalidated by the message. However, as illustrated by the example
of the fruit basket, with a one-level of belief set the situations of focusing and updating are
indistinguishable: In this case the Minimal rule is equivalent to Bayes' rule.
General Discussion
Many psychologists, in the wake of Edwards, Lindman, & Savage (1963), hold the
Bayesian model as the behavioural norm for human probability judgment (Chater & Oaksford,
2008). This choice implies that probabilities are interpreted as subjective degrees of belief and
that Bayes’ rule is adopted as the revision rule (de Finetti, 1964). The adoption of a Bayesian
standpoint for the study of the revision of probability judgment has two consequences. The first
consequence is to impose a theoretical limitation on the scope of experimental studies of
revision: The use of Bayes' rule restricts one (by definition) to studying revision in a stable
universe of reference. Thus, psychologists working in the field of probability revision have never
considered the conceptual differences between the situations of revision that have been defined
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in AI, philosophy and cognitive economics. The quasi-totality of the experimental paradigms
addresses focusing (for a review, see Baratgin & Politzer, 2007),  whereas updating has not been
explicitly considered.11 The other consequence is that if theorists do endorse the subjective
nature of degrees of belief as implied by the Bayesian model, then they must take into account
participants' expectations and attributions of mental states to the experimenter such as intentions
and epistemic states. This is why a pragmatic analysis of all the components of the method
(design, content of the task, materials, administration, response format) is crucial (Baratgin &
Politzer, 2006).
In the present investigation we have taken a serious view on these two consequences:
considering an evolving universe and integrating the pragmatic constraints. We take up these two
issues in turn. Regarding the former we will show, in the next sub-section, the interest of our
approach at a meta-theoretic level as the various attempts made in the literature to explain the
MHP paradoxical results can all be recast within the framework of updating. Regarding the
latter, it was mentioned earlier that they are crucial to characterise the MHP, a claim that we are
going to vindicate in the second sub-section.
Viewing the universe as evolving
The different explanations of participants’ response found in the literature can be
reanalysed as evidence for an updating interpretation of the host’s message. We present four
arguments in support of this view (for technical points see Baratgin, 2009).
1. The explanations based on the use of "simple heuristics" (Ichikawa, 1989; Ichikawa &
Takeichi, 1990; Shimojo & Ichikawa, 1989; Yamagishi, 2003) can be reinterpreted, from a
mathematical point of view, as the application of the Minimal rule to different interpretations.
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2. The explanations based on the mental models theory according to which people would not be
able to construct a complete set of mental models of the puzzle due to limitation in working
memory (Girotto & Gonzalez, 2000; Johnson-Laird, et al., 1999) or on the partition-edit-count
strategy according to which people would evaluate conditional probabilities by subjectively
partitioning the sample space into a set of interchangeable events (Fox & Levay, 2004) can also
be viewed as descriptions of a process of revision using the Minimal rule (see section 3 of the
Appendix). In other words, the participants who have initially taken into account and understood
the host's strategy will not take them into consideration to evaluate the new probability
distribution in an updating interpretation. In particular when the experimenter explicitly specifies
the strategy of the TV host as well as the rules of MHP, participants still give the modal response
(Baratgin & Politzer, 2007; Burns & Wieth, 2004; Krauss & Wang, 2003; Shimojo & Ichikawa,
1989).
3. According to Glymour (2001) people have difficulty comprehending the causal structure
underlying the MHP and subsequently fail to recognise the collider principle: The choice of the
host to place the car behind a door and participants’ initial selection (here D1) determines which
door the host will then open to show a goat. This can be reinterpreted by noticing that in
updating there cannot be a collider principle because the problem becomes a simple problem
(symmetrical) of two doors. It follows that participants neglect the collider principle (Burns &
Wieth, 2004), and also have the general belief described in Shimojo (1989) that the posterior
probabilities of the remaining alternatives should never be less than their prior probabilities
when one alternative is removed.
4. The cases of improvement reported in the literature can be reinterpreted and explained as cases
where the manipulation encourages the interpretation of the host’s choice to show a goat behind
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door D3 (out of the two doors D2 and D3) as a focusing message rather than an updating
message. Various experimental studies show that probability judgments tend to conform better to
Bayes' rule when the experimental paradigm refers to natural frequencies (as opposed to single-
event probabilities) (Brase, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1998; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 1995; Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss, & Martignon, 2002), when the distributions of
probabilities are formulated in term of chance (Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001) and more generally
when the “nested sets”, that is, subsets relative to larger sets in the task structure, are explicit
(Sloman, Over, Slovak, & Stibel, 2003). This is the case with the isomorphic problems of the
MHP written in a natural frequency format (Yamagishi, 2003) and also with the standard
statement when the experimenter gives a diagram that illustrates the biprobabilistic structure and
the focusing character of the revision message (Cheng & Pitt, 2003; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2000;
Ichikawa, 1989; Yamagishi, 2003). However these specific formats which facilitate the Bayesian
solution actually both clarify the biprobabilistic structure and enhance the focusing
understanding of the situation of revision.
Pragmatics constraints
 It was assumed earlier that the experimenter and the participants may not have the same
representation of the revision process (focusing vs. updating). In support of this assumption, we
develop three points, the last two being based on relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).
1. As explained earlier, the focusing situation is an atemporal situation of probability revision.
After a focusing message individuals modify their frame of reference in considering a smaller
set, but they stick to their initial probability distribution that encompasses the whole initial set.
The situation of focusing is easier to comprehend when one can have a statistical interpretation
of the problem, for example when imagining a sufficiently large number of games (Dubois &
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Prade, 1992). However, the MHP is proposed as a “one-shot” game where a situation of temporal
change is suggested. At time t0 participants are invited to work out their prior distribution; at
time t1 they learn a new message implied by the host’s action that seems to modify the initial
problem structure (shifting from three to two closed doors); then the experimenter asks a
judgment of probability that can be interpreted as a request for a brand new probability
distribution. In more intuitive terms, participants may think that because the problem has
changed, so has the probability.
2. The Bayesian Solution proves in contradiction with pragmatic principles of communication. In
the present case, participants make their initial choice of a door (here D1) without any special
information related to this object. They base their choice on the sole information, “The car is
hidden behind one of the three doors”. The uncertainty leads them to the attribution of a
probability of 1/3 to door D1. Within the framework of relevance theory, the communicative
principle posits that any utterance conveys a presumption of its own (optimal) relevance. In other
words, participants assume that if the experimenter sends a message, it deserves to be treated.
Thus for participants any new information given by the experimenter carries a presumption of
relevance in relation with the aim of the problem (to know if the car is behind D1). In fact, the
new information can be expected to be all the more important (relevant) as participants have
initially chosen the door randomly, and this knowledge is shared with the experimenter.
Consequently, they are strongly invited to modify their prior probability regarding the door that
is the most relevant, namely D1. But in the focusing situation the learning of the new information
(the host’s choice to show a goat behind door D3, out of the two doors D2 and D3 not chosen by
the participant) does not change participants’ initial degree of belief that the car is behind door
D1, so that the Bayesian Solution (1/3) is countermanded by the principle of relevance. It only
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modifies participants’ initial degree of belief that the car is behind one of the doors D2 and D3.
The experimental situation is akin to the well-known experiment by McGarrigle and Donaldson
(1975) on the conservation of number in children which demonstrates the effect of repeating a
question after the experimenter's intervention: This results in the child’s presuming that the
response must change.
3. Interpreting the host’s choice to show a goat behind door D3 (out of the two doors D2 and D3)
as an the updating message, “the possibility that the host shows that there is a goat behind D2 has
been suppressed”, achieves greater relevance than interpreting it as a focusing message.
According to relevance theory, participants are more inclined to pay attention to messages with
an important contextual effect and with an expected treatment that requires little cognitive effort.
The host’s choice to show a goat behind door D3 arrives after the host's notice that one of the
two doors conceals a goat, whose implied meaning is “one of the two doors (D2 or D3) will be
excluded”. This information conveys a strong contextual effect with little cognitive effort (world
D2 or D3 will be eliminated by the host). It actually comprises two compacted pieces of
information. The first piece, as we have just mentioned, concerns the host’s choice of one door
among D2 and D3. The second piece concerns what is behind D3, namely a goat. The first
element constitutes the key to construct the representation of the puzzle in a focusing framework
but the comprehension of its consequences requires a considerable cognitive effort because
participants must work out the alternative possibility that the host shows a goat behind D2, and
then keep this in memory (even after the host’s action and the perception that D2 is open). This
element has no important contextual effect because it is difficult to apprehend its relevance with
respect to the aim of the puzzle if participants have not constructed the full representation of the
puzzle. On the contrary, the second element of the message (its ostensive part, whatever it may
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be, to show a goat behind door D 2 or to show a goat behind door D3) is expected by participants
as it follows the participants' interpretation of the verbal part of the host’s message “one of the
two doors (D2 or D3) will be excluded”. Consequently, the second element of the message
benefits from an important contextual effect in concretely eliminating the door D3 from the set
of possible doors. Participants are then left with two doors (D1 and D2).
 Conclusion: A more optimistic view on participants’ consistency in focusing situations
Our experiments strongly support the hypothesis of an updating process in human
probability revision. Experiment 1 indicates that updating seems a situation that can be routinely
induced by the context. Experiment 2 indicates that updating seems to be the usual interpretation
in our MHP isomorphic problem. In this updating interpretation, participants answer in
agreement with the Minimal rule. Experiments 3 and 4 show that people can distinguish the
situations of focusing and updating when the biprobabilistic structure of the problem is explicit
and that they produce their answer accordingly, that is, the Bayesian answer in the case of
focusing and the answer based on the Minimal rule in the case of updating.
More generally, these experiments illustrate the importance of analysing the
interpretation of the revision message prior to the experimental study. We believe that a
complete experimental program designed to study probability revision should take into account
the different situations of revision and adapt its methodology accordingly. In the present paper
we have concerned ourselves with focusing and updating. Indeed, psychologists have not
distinguished these situations of revision, with the possible exception of causal reasoning in
which the notion of intervention reveals that updating appears natural to lay people. Moreover,
such a complete experimental program might have to go beyond the restricted framework of
additive probabilities.
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The overwhelming majority of the studies have concerned themselves with focusing
situations. In these studies experimenters often interpret the term “Bayesianism” as a simple
synonym of Bayes’ rule techniques (for a review see Baratgin & Politzer, 2006). In most cases
the question addressed is whether participants perform in agreement with Bayes’ rule. The
participants' probabilities (prior and likelihoods) are assumed to correspond to the fixed values
provided by the experimenter in the instructions. The discrepancies found with the “true result”
defined by experimenters are analysed as evidence for human irrationality (Piattelli-Palmerini,
1994) or as evidence for the inadequacy of the Bayesian model (Lopes, 1991). A number of
cognitive explanations of participants’ responses have been proposed and debated: Heuristics
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), frequentist format (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995),
nested-set relations (Sloman, et al., 2003) or mental models (Johnson-Laird, et al., 1999). The
experimental results that have been exploited in the debate on participants’ rationality and the
robustness of the Bayesian model can be reinterpreted in the light of the classification of the
three situations of revision: The statement of the problem used in each experimental paradigm is
open to an interpretation in terms of one of these situations of revision. As these involve different
rules, it is clear that a response incorrect under one interpretation may turn out to be correct
under another interpretation.
Our investigation started from the observation that a large majority of paradigms used in
the experimental literature corresponds to a situation of focusing, but none explicitly corresponds
to a situation of updating. Thus, there exists a significant imbalance in the various studies of
probability revision. The lack of consideration for the situation of updating can also invite one to
question the very results of these studies because an answer considered as erroneous in a
situation of focusing may well be viewed as coherent in a situation that is interpreted as
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updating. In the present study, we have identified the pragmatic origin of the updating
interpretation of a focusing situation. It remains for future work to determine what factors other
than pragmatic (such as individual, social, etc.) may induce people to favour either interpretation.
Finally, two points at a metatheoretical level are in order. One, the conceptual approach
that consists of distinguishing several situations of revision together with the restriction of the
application of Bayes’ rule is in no way a critique of Bayesianism and of the importance of
Bayes’ rule. The fundamental question which we consider is ‘how to revise when the
world/problem has undergone a transformation?’ This situation is, classically, kept aside from
the realm of Bayesian revision (see de Finetti, 1974). The new approach offers an enrichment to
standard Bayesianism, and what is called the Minimal rule should not be understood as an
alternative to Bayes’ rule, but rather as a complementary rule applicable to the situation in
question where Bayes’ rule just does not apply. Two, as suggested above, the distinction between
focusing and updating enables one to reinterpret the various explanations of performance on the
MHP found in the psychological literature. Our approach helps reveal their implicit hypotheses
or missing justifications. It does not constitute a challenge to these theories but rather a
parsimonious way of analysing and characterising them.
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Footnotes
1. There is also another revision situation in a stable universe (not considered in this paper) that is
called in the literature revising (Alchourron, Gärdenfors, & Makinson, 1985). When revising you
do not know precisely the class of  reference (your beliefs are erroneous or incomplete) and  the
message you learn specifies or disconfirms your initial belief.
2. There are several specifications of “Bayes’ rule”.  Although these specifications are equivalent,
in this paper it appears important to distinguish two major forms.  Let H and ¬H be two
alternative hypotheses, let M be one event such that M ≠ ∅, P(H) the prior probability of H,
P(H|M) the posterior probability, P(M|H) and P(M|¬H) the likelihoods and finally P(M) the
probability of message M.
Form 1, “conditional probability”: 
€ 
P(H | M) = P(H∧M)
P(M)
,
Form 2, “Bayes’ identity”: 
€ 
P(H | M) = P(H) P(M | H)
P(M)
.
Bayes’s rule is a revision rule that is defined only for a stable universe. It is the only possible rule
in a focusing situation. It operates a change of reference class, namely it leads from a prior to a
posterior probability (de Finetti, 1974). Bayes'  rule also proves an adequate rule (among others)
to change degrees of belief in a situation of revising (Walliser & Zwirn, 2002).
3. From a theoretical point of view, this rule is a particular instantiation of Lewis’s General
Imaging rule (Cross, 2000; Dubois & Prade, 1993; Gärdenfors, 1988; Lepage, 1997; Lewis,
1976; Perea, 2007).
4. The MHP is usually presented in two versions.  One standard version originates from a
popular television game show, Let’s Make A Deal, programmed in 1963 in America. It is set up
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as a problem of choice where participants decide to switch or keep the door initially chosen (vos
Savant, 1990). An older version called the Three Prisoners Problem is cast in a probabilistic
format (Gardner, 1959). In this paper we analyse the puzzle in a probabilistic format.
5. This solution of the MHP was first suggested by Dubois & Prade (1992).
6. Numerous studies of probability judgment have supported the hypothesis that participants
infer a different representation of the task than experimenters do, based on various pragmatic
considerations (Dulany & Hilton, 1988; Krosnick, Li, & Lehman, 1990; Macchi, 1995; Politzer
& Macchi, 2005; Politzer & Noveck, 1991).
7. We borrow here the term naive from the theorists who differentiate a Bayesian conditioning
on a naive set and a Bayesian conditioning on a more sophisticated set in the MHP (Grünwald &
Halpern, 2003; Jeffrey, 1988). Independently, it was also used by some psychologists in a similar
sense (Fox & Levay, 2004; Johnson-Laird, et al., 1999).
8. Unlike the first two experiments, in this and the next experiment the numbers were relatively
small. The first two experiments were run with larger numbers because we used novel materials,
so that the base rate of incorrect answers and the order of magnitude of the effects to be
demonstrated were unknown.
9. A number of academic people, including a world famous mathematician, wrote to Vos
Savant (1991) to express their disagreement that 1/3 was the correct answer to the MHP (see also
Vazsonyi, 1999).
10. The solutions 1/5 in the focusing situation and 1/3 in the updating situation are obvious by
changing the prior probabilities (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) to (2/4, 1/4, 1/4) in Fig. 6.
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11. A very small minority of studies deals with the situation of revising (see note 1) (Baratgin &
Politzer, 2007). Updating has already been considered explicitly in a deductive framework, in
connection with the problem of belief revision for knowledge bases (Elio & Pelletier, 1997;
Politzer & Carles, 2001), and implicitly in the field of counterfactual reasoning: In effect, a
counterfactual statement does express a modification of the universe, albeit virtual. Finally, the
situation called intervention in the field of causal reasoning (Pearl, 2000) can be considered as a
special case of updating. A few experimental studies on causal reasoning have shown that the
situation of intervention seems natural for participants (Lagnado & Sloman, 2004, 2006; Sloman
& Lagnado, 2005; Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers, & Blum, 2003).
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Appendix: The focusing and updating solutions of the MHP
1. A two-level probabilistic structure
The MHP (after the participant has chosen door D1) is a problem characterised by a
hierarchical belief structure. Participants must have beliefs about elementary properties of doors
(to be opened by the host and to have the car or a goat behind them). The existence of different
layers in the MHP can be made explicit and its analysis in terms of possible worlds can easily be
visualised by a “two-level probabilistic structure ” of belief (Walliser & Zwirn, in press) as
Figure 6. Belief structures of the Monty Hall Puzzle after the focusing message ‘goatD3’.
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follows (see Fig. 6(a1)):
- A layer 0 composed of the two possible choices for the host to show a goat behind one door
(out of the two doors D2 and D3 not chosen by the participant) and noted respectively with
single quotation marks 'goatD2' and  'goatD3'.
- A layer 1 composed of the three possibilities that the car is behind each of the three doors. It
corresponds to the following worlds: { carD1, carD2, carD3}.
- A layer 2 composed of the initial choice of a door made by the participant (D1).
The two probability distributions from layer 1 to 0 and from layer 2 to 1 are defined by
the statement of the MHP. The layer 2 (the actual world) defines a probability distribution on
three layer 1 worlds (the three possibilities corresponding to the presence of a car behind a door)
and each layer 1 world defines a probability distribution on two layer 0 worlds ('goatD2' and
'goatD3'). The probability distributions can be inferred from the statement of the MHP with
implicit and explicit hypotheses about the host’s action. In the beginning (corresponding to point
(i) of the MHP statement) it is assumed that the host has no preference for a specific door when
he initially places the car. The prior probabilities of the three possible worlds carD1, carD2 and
carD3 are equal to 1/3 (“all three equally likely”). It is also assumed that the host has no
preference between doors D2 and D3 should the car be behind D1 (which is implicit in point (ii)
of the statement in the majority of the versions of the puzzle). The probabilities of the two
possible worlds 'goatD2' and 'goatD3' are 1/2 when world carD1 is the actual world. Finally we
know that when the car is behind D2, the host is bound to show D3 and when the car is behind
D3 the host is bound to show D2 (see Fig. 6a1). We note that this two-level probabilistic
structure can be collapsed into an equivalent one-level probabilistic structure with the set of four
possible worlds (called "reference class" (Halpern, 2005)) obtained by crossing the layer 1 world
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and the layer 0 world: { carD1∧ 'goatD2', carD1∧ 'goatD3', carD2∧ 'goatD3' (= carD2), carD3∧ 'goatD2' (=
carD3)} with the prior probabilities {1/6, 1/6, 1/3, 1/3}.
2. The coherent solution 1/3 in the focusing interpretation.
As mentioned in the introduction, focusing does not really correspond to a temporal process of
belief revision. It is assumed that one object is selected from the universe and that a message
releases information about this selected object. Then a reference class different from the initial
one is considered by focusing attention on a given subset of the original set, in the present case
focusing on the host’s choice of D3 as opposed to all the choices (D3 or D2). After the message
'goatD3', you still consider the same probability distribution but you change the reference class of
the whole initial set of possible worlds. You focus your attention on the subset of the original
system in which world 'goatD3' is the actual world. This means: (i) executing the collapsing
process that has just been mentioned in order to specify the reference class {carD1∧ 'goatD2',
carD1∧ 'goatD3', carD2∧ 'goatD3', carD3∧ 'goatD2'}; (ii) focusing on those (crossed) worlds in the
reference class that are consistent with the message (in bold) {carD1∧ 'goatD2' (=1/6), carD1∧
'goatD3'(=1/6), carD2∧ 'goatD3'(=1/3), carD3∧ 'goatD2'(=1/3)} and (iii) normalising the probabilities
of the focused worlds (see Fig. 6a2). Thus your probability is still 1/3 because there are twice as
many chances for carD2 to be the actual world as there are for carD1 (the probabilities before
normalisation are 1/3 and 1/6, respectively). In brief, to give the Bayesian Solution, participants
must (i) build the correct hierarchical structure of Fig. 6(a1) and (ii) interpret correctly the
message 'goatD3' in a focusing framework.
3. The coherent solution 1/2 in an updating interpretation.
We now consider the representation which leads participants to the modal answer. This solution
is obtained after receiving the message interpreted as “the possibility that the host shows that
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there is a goat behind D2 has been suppressed” (noted 'goatD2'). This message gives information
about the possible transformations of the actual universe. The revision must be obtained by the
Minimal rule. As we have seen with the example of the fruit basket, applying the Minimal rule to
obtain the new reference class consists of, first excluding the possibility 'goatD2', and second
normalising to obtain the new probability distribution corresponding to the representation of the
new universe. So you consider first a new MHP where the host does not open D2 (noted ∅, see
Fig. 6(a1) and 6(b1)). Hence the new reference class is {carD1∧'goatD3', carD2∧ 'goatD3', carD3∧∅}
associated with the probability distribution {1/3, 1/3, 1/3}. Now if you know that there is a goat
behind D3, this message constitutes a focusing message on the new universe and you focus on
D1 and D2 because you are certain that the car is behind the doors D1 or D2. The solution is 1/2.
We can easily identify the relationship that obtains between the two revision situations
and the two revision rules (for a theoretical approach see  Walliser & Zwirn, in press). The
situation of updating on the first reference class at t0 {carD1∧‘goatD2', carD1∧‘goatD3’,
carD2∧‘goatD3’, carD3∧‘goatD2’} when it is known that 'goatD2' actually is equivalent to a focusing
situation on a second reference class at t1 {carD1(= carD1∧ 'goatD3'), carD2(= carD2∧ 'goatD3'),
carD3(= carD3∧∅)} in which the received information is “the car is not behind D3”. So, the
Minimal rule applied within the reference class at t0 leads one to conditioning by Bayes’ rule
after the message on the reference class at t1 {carD1, carD2, carD3}. This solution amounts to
neglecting the relation (inferred from the knowledge of the host's strategy) from layer 1 to layer 0
and considering only layer 1. This amounts to considering first the set {carD1, carD2, carD3} and
then focusing on doors D1 and D2 after the focusing message implying that the car is not behind
door D3. Hence we obtain 1/2. However participants might reach this solution by another path:
Instead of following this focusing strategy, they could follow the simplified updating strategy
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once again by representing the set "without the door D3” (because they know that there is no car
behind D3) so that in the end they get the new set formed by the two doors D1 and D2, and infer
an equiprobability between D1 and D2 (see Fig. 6(b2)).
It is noteworthy that the solution 1/3 for the MHP in an updating framework is
theoretically possible (Cross, 2000). However this would require a different hierarchical
structure. This would be the case if the two possible worlds "the car is behind door D2" and "the
car is behind door D3" were regarded as closer to each other than they are to "the car is behind
door D1". But this is not the case in our experiments 3 and 4 in which the experimental paradigm
which is isomorphic to the three-level structure, explicitly imposes an equidistance between the
three possible worlds. These considerations in terms of possible worlds are somehow technical
(see Baratgin, 2009) and we cannot develop them in this paper.
